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Abstract
Madagascar’s most cattle-dependent regions have, in recent years, been surrounded by
narratives of a sudden and violent decline in both the sheer number of and benefits conferred by
the nation’s distinctive zebu cattle, narratives which largely attribute this decline to theft and
insecurity. This paper examines the broader state of cattle-based livelihoods in two such
regions, Haute Matsiatra and Ihorombe, through evidence garnered from semi-structured
interviews conducted over three weeks in the major cattle market towns of Ambalavao and
Ihosy, and in the rural commune of Sakaviro, five kilometers south of Ambalavao. By
incorporating secondary historical sources and recent work from both Malagasy and Western
academics, the paper finds that the cattle economy has cyclically experienced high levels of
related violence, foreign involvement in cattle trafficking, and conflict between and among the
local and Malagasy state institutions involved in the process. However, the paper also finds that
this historically cyclical system is under increasing duress from two mutually worsening sets of
stressors: one constituted by deepening poverty, environmental adversity, and population
growth, the other a pervasive process of social disintegration within pastoralists communities
and the institutions that work with them. It concludes with a set of recommendations for relevant
actors in an attempt to avoid the worst-case scenario- the collapse of cattle-based livelihoods
due to a rapid decline in Madagascar’s cattle population.
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For my Grandma, Geraldine “Tedde” Myers, whose certainty that when cows lay down it means
it’s going rain would have come in handy in a place where nothing is ever less certain than cows
and the rain.
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Introduction: Narratives, Questions, and PurposeIn late September of this year, I found myself sitting at a dinner table in Mahajanga, in
the northwest of Madagascar, hearing one hell of a story. I’d heard a bit about the rampant
cattle theft currently afflicting the south of the country, and had asked my host for her views on
the subject. To my surprise, she calmly replied that what most people did not know was that the
thieves, known as dahalo, were “made”, not born. Members of the Bara ethnic group living in
Madagascar’s southern forests, they consisted of a sort of “medicine” of pearls, cattle horns,
leaves, and red and black fabrics. I choked on my rice in surprise at the time, but I don’t think I
would do so today. Madagascar is, for better or for worse (usually both), a country often defined
by its narratives. I suspect that this is partially attributable to the strength of the Malagasy as a
nation of orators, of Madagascar as the land of kabary. For me, no conversation on the subject
of the country’s past and present has passed without one or another convincingly grand account
of the fate of the place being conjured up by one of my hosts. I’ve grown rather familiar with
each these: the tumble off of the cloud nine that was the heyday of the First Republic, a corrupt
state slowly breaking the backs of a noble and courageous people, foreign powers meddling to
hold back the full potential of the Malagasy, and so on. The stories have their respective
adherents, and more often than not a firm grounding in the truth. There is one portion of the
Malagasy experience, however, where the stories seem to have taken a bus-too-many out of
town, to some dark edge of what’s known and expected, where they compete with each other
for a sheer lack of believability. To my steadily evolving surprise since I arrived here, these
stories are being told about cattle, and more often than not about their theft. They are told by
outsiders: There is the story told on the front pages of the Antananarivo-based newspapers
seemingly every morning, of murderous bands of thieves roaming lawless regions in defiance of
valiant forces of order. There’s the inevitable accompanying tale of the debasement of a rite of
passage among the Bara people of the center-south, leading to an unprecedentedly violent and
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chaotic situation on the distant southern plains. One hears, too, the story of state complicity in
heinous reprisals against pastoralist communities told in recent years by, among others,
Amnesty International and the French journalist Bilal Tarabey (Tarabey 2014). While these
stories of dahalo are worth telling, an entirely different pack of stories is being told more often by
insiders: One is that of the inextricable link between the omby and the Malagasy, for whom the
cattle serve in a host of indispensable capacities. Another is a darker story being told about the
precipitous decline of Madagascar’s cattle and the ways of life that depend on them. These are
but a few of the stories, and a different paper would be well-spent in properly telling them. This
paper, however, was not written to relate these stories (which have been buzzing around my
head since I first heard them): rather, it is an attempt to confront them. In writing about omby,
one cannot avoid dealing with these narratives, accepting some and rejecting others, in order to
(I’ve hoped) depict the relevant characters and events as they actually exist. To be fair, my
research has increasingly led me to the conclusion that my version of events will be just that –a
different account of the same story. That being said, I strongly believe that the tales told by both
Westerners and the Malagasy about cattle in Madagascar have fallen several steps short of
being holistic, to the disadvantage of those who have heard them. This one attempts to bridge
at least part of the gap by answering some of the more tangible questions which led me to
undertake this research in the first place: What are the effects of broader social, economic, and
political processes on cattle-based livelihoods in southern Madagascar? What are these
livelihoods, precisely, and how do they work? How do local and national institutions interact with
these livelihoods? Has there been a decline among pastoralist economies in the areas of
study? If so, why? How do broader processes like urbanization, climate change, drought,
political instability, crime, and population growth effect pastoralism here? It is only in providing a
few tenuous answers to these questions that this paper aims to meet its broader aim: to cut
through the mass of narratives surrounding Madagascar’s cattle livelihoods in an attempt to
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provide an explication of the current state of omby systems and the people who depend on
them. If such an explication can be even plausibly forwarded, my hope is that it will spur further
research on a topic which has been woefully under-examined by Western academics. Towards
this end, I should acknowledge the fundamental process that has shaped this research: that of a
discernible and quickening decline in the number of cattle in Madagascar. The remainder of this
paper will explore the myriad causes of this decline, and its broader implications for the
populations most affected by it. Put simply, the Malagasy cattle economy is a bellwether
system. It is an integral part of rural life, and a vital liaison with the urban world. As a functioning
element of Malagasy well-being, it is an indicator of many of the broader processes eating away
at Madagascar’s social fabric. Although the fact is rarely given sufficient attention by outside
observers or cattle professionals, the cattle economy is by its very nature historically cyclical. I
contend that this cycle is today, however, beset by two new, very different sets of stressors- an
increasing strain on daily life made up of deepening poverty, environmental adversity, and
population growth, and a pervasive process of social disintegration within pastoralist
communities and the institutions that work with them. Moreover, the effects of changes taking
place within this system extend far beyond its constituent elements: the holistic role played by
cattle for those who live in tandem with them means that any decline in the strength of the
system will have far-reaching effects on nearly every aspect of rural life. These effects can only
be truly understood in light of the historical, political, and economic backgrounds of both the
system and the study sites in question, and with an introduction to some of the basics of how
pastoralist economies function and why it’s important that they continue to do so. Then, drawing
from both interviews and participant observation, I will outline the broad workings of today’s
cattle system with a particular focus on the regions of study, and begin to elucidate the causes
and effects of the cattle decline mentioned above. Almost inevitably, I will devote some space to
addressing the place of dahalo in all of this, before moving on to examine the current status of
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“hardship” stress, and of social and institutional cohesion, in the context of cattle, as conveyed
to me by my informants. I will also analyze the themes emerging from the conversations of the
past three weeks in view of both sets of stressors, which I will refer to here as the “hardship
trinity” and “multilevel anomie”. Finally, I discuss the wide-ranging effects of these findings as a
whole, provide some recommendations rooted in the views expressed by my informants, and
pose questions for future study.
MethodologyThis paper is the product of 35 semi-structured interviews1 conducted across three sites along
southern Madagascar’s “cattle corridor” (Route Nationale 7) from November 8th to November
23rd, 2015. I spent 6 days in the cattle market town of Ambalavao, at the southern edge of the
central highlands in Haute Matsiatra region, 5 days in a rural commune, Sakaviro, five
kilometers to the south, and five days in the cattle market town of Ihosy, the plateaued capital of
Ihorombe region. The sites were selected for a variety of reasons: the intrinsic importance of
Ambalavao and Ihosy to the cattle economy, the timely availability of a rural contact in the
Sakaviro area, and the potential insights inherent in comparing two geographically approximate
(but ethnically and economically diverse) regions. Both Ambalavao and Ihosy are, in fact, useful
locations for interviewing informants from rural areas, serving as they do as regional hubs of
exchange for their respective hinterlands. This was a particularly useful function in light of
increasing insecurity across wide swathes of rural Haute Matsiatra and Ihorombe, which limited
my possibilities for study within the rural context. Interviews were conducted with herders, local
government officials, Ministry of Livestock officials, and market insiders, to name a few of the
major informant groups. The data from these interviews was supplemented by three days of
observation in the markets of Ambalavao and Ihosy, and time spent observing the versatile

1

Two of which were conducted on November 3, 2015 in Antananarivo.
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roles of cattle in the rural setting of Sakaviro. My findings draw on a diverse body of literature
dealing with the history of the cattle systems and peoples I encountered throughout the study, a
theoretical background for the various factors surrounding cattle decline, and other insights into
rural life and pastoralism as it exists here in southern Madagascar. In synthesizing these
elements, and viewing them as parts of a larger whole, I was able arrive at some of the tentative
conclusions outlined above.
Ethical ConsiderationsCattle are, at the moment, an extremely sensitive topic of conversation in the areas in
which this research was conducted. Much of this sensitivity can be attributed to entirely
understandable fears of cattle theft and the violence against people which frequently
accompanies it. These fears can extend to topics I initially considered innocuous, like the mere
number of cattle a herder owns. Most offered this freely, but several herders I spoke with were
palpably suspicious of the idea of providing any details on herd size, and I quickly learned that
this was a topic better brought up by the participant than of my own initiative. That broader
principle ended up being my rule of thumb during interviews. If theft was not brought up by
participants, it was not discussed. The same was true of corruption within the cattle economy,
the breathtaking extent of which proved to be one of the project’s principal sensitivities. At times
it seemed as if every actor I spoke with had (convincing) reason to believe that every other actor
was guilty of malfeasance. Again, I waited to discuss the topic until it was introduced by the
participant: otherwise it was not discussed. All of this should be more than sufficient to give the
reader an indication of the working and personal relationships which could be damaged, the
criminal charges which could be brought, and the bodily harm which could be inflicted if I chose
to employ the names of my participants in this paper. The fundamental responsibility of the
researcher is to first do no harm, and so I will not refer to anyone by name here. That being
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said, I do strongly believe (in keeping with conversations I’ve had with my thesis advisor at the
University of Denver) in the inalienable accountability of institutions, and so will reference them
as freely as my prerogative to protect the personal identities of my participants permits. It is also
incumbent upon me as a responsible researcher to present as balanced of an image as
possible of the parties discussed in this study, something which I will try my utmost to do
throughout the paper. In terms of the findings themselves, research is justifiable only to the
extent to which it can act as a net positive in the lives of those who participate in it. The tone
and content of the conversations I had with people in all three of my sites leads me to believe
that if nothing else, discussing the subjects we did provided an outlet for frustrations and ideas
participants might not have otherwise found occasion to express. With this in mind, I have tried
to accurately report the views and concerns of my participants, in the hopes that future
research, or well-connected readers, may draw relevant lessons for future involvement with
rural livelihoods or pastoralism. It is also important to acknowledge the inherent power
differential in my reporting any of these findings as a white, foreign researcher. I attempted to
put participants at ease concerning this differential by trying to actively minimize the formality of
the occasion: greeting and chatting in Malagasy before interviews, in particular, was essential to
making interviews more conversational than inquisitional. Finally, a major ethical concern (and a
potential limitation for the validity of any of these findings) is the large preponderance of male
informants who took part in this study. The Malagasy cattle economy is staffed almost
exclusively by men, with agriculture in the areas where I studied often being seen as the domain
of women. While I wrestled with the issue throughout the interview process, I ultimately
determined that studied attempts to include female perspectives on some of the broader social
questions I was examining was a potentially useful way to temper some of the one-sidedness of
my data and welcome in other perspectives from these communities. Still, cultural
considerations as to the appropriateness of a male foreigner interviewing a woman without the
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knowledge of a male relative, conveyed to me by a contact from the area of study, led me to
restrict my interviews with women to government and private sector offices (which, it turns out,
are also overwhelmingly male). Regardless, I have made every effort to address these ethical
concerns in both the recording and reporting of the information I was fortunate enough to glean
from my participants.
LimitationsWhatever else, dear reader, you learn from this paper, keep in mind that it is predicated upon
the results of 35 interviews conducted over three weeks by a first-time researcher. The depth
and quality of my questions and interactions is, quite simply, a serious limitation on the validity
of the results. While I believe I was able to assemble a body of evidence sufficient to identify
some of the most immediately relevant factors, I would have liked to have had 6 months to do
this project, and another 3 to prepare for it. Unfortunately, I had neither, which meant a short
project with very little preparation, and quite a lot of potential error. For better or worse, you are
reading the result. The second most immediate limitation was the existence of two distinct
language barriers in the form French and Malagasy. I was able to conduct a large majority of my
interviews in French (which I speak adequately enough for the purposes of this project), but that
fact doubtlessly changed both the content and tone of my conversations by injecting the
presence of a third (and colonial) language between myself and my participants. With that in
mind, I did conduct several interviews in Malagasy, which I speak at an elementary, but
passable, level. These interviews provided me with insights (which I made certain to verify ad
nauseam during conversations) that I would not have otherwise garnered, particularly in the
markets, where much less French was spoken than among most of my other groups of
informants. That being said, I am sure that quite a bit of additional information was lost in
translation. Fortunately, I had the services of a French-speaking translator in Sakaviro, where
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virtually nobody spoke a foreign language. While I was fortunate enough to receive some rural
perspectives through my visit to Sakaviro, I was unable, for want of time and concerns over
security, to pursue a comparable stay in rural Ihorombe, which no doubt would have provided
me with altogether different answers from a very different social and physical environment. I
was also constantly confronted with a lack of reliable quantitative information, which left me
dependent on the responses of my informants and my own powers of observation to
corroborate some of the most commonly discussed trends. While some quantitative information
is included below, I was informed by several people ostensibly responsible for gathering such
information that the Malagasy government, for instance, had no real idea of how many cattle
were in the country. As concerns state sources as a whole, I am aware that the preponderance
of civil servants among my informants could well imbue the project with a modernist streak
implicitly disparaging of informants outside of state institutions (the long history of which is
discussed below). To balance this, I have made a real effort to engage critically with this
modernist, state-constructed narrative. Finally, my relatively limited sample size and the
outsized number of well-educated French speakers within it likely gave me a very different set of
data than might have been the case had I used a translator for every interview2. With that in
mind, I have tried to ensure that my findings are as valid as the circumstances have permitted
them to be. This meant attempting to gather as much high-quality data as I could in the limited
time available to me, grounding it in relevant secondary sources, and adhering to the ethical
standards set for the project by both myself and my Local Review Board.

2

At the same time, 35 interviews has proven rather more than I can process for a paper being written in less than
a week, so I will likely be unable to do that much justice to the valuable information my informants were kind
enough to share with me.
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BackgroundStudy SitesIn the southern third of Haute Matsiatra region at the edge of Madagascar’s central highlands,
Ambalavao sits along Route Nationale (RN) 7. RN 7 runs south from the nation’s capital,
Antananarivo, through the regional capital and major city of Fianarantsoa, and southwest to the
coastal city of Toliara. According to the Oxford Poverty and Human Development Initiative’s
(OPHI’s) June 2015 Country Briefing on Madagascar, Haute Matsiatra (which contains 5.4% of
the national population) ranks 11th out of the nation’s 22 regions in its multidimensional poverty
index (MPI), with an MPI of 0.400, compared with a national score of 0.357, and a national rural
score of 0.396 (Oxford Poverty and Human Development Initiative (2015), p.5). Statistically
speaking at least, the region is thus highly typical of the economic conditions found elsewhere
on the island. It is of further value as a site because of the widespread amalgamation of
agriculture and livestock raising, both of which have their regional economic centers in
Ambalavao markets. The aforementioned highway is the main artery for the transport of cattle
from southern Madagascar to the major consumption markets of Antananarivo (often referred to
as Tana) and Toamasina. As a direct result of the highway’s construction in the early 20th
century, Ambalavao’s market was founded in 1916 as a point of departure for cattle being
purchased by buyers from the northern highlands (usually of the Merina ethnic group from
around Tana) (B. Rabarijoana, personal communication, 11/23/2015). It functions in much the
same way today as it did then, relying heavily on the steady flow of cattle on Wednesdays and
Thursdays around which the rest of the local economy is based. After all, Ambalavao is a town
of exchange, and not merely within the cattle economy. On Wednesdays, farmers from the
surrounding countryside come to town to do business, sell produce, and buy essential goods.
The town thus fulfills a vital role as an economic hub for those living in its vicinity, as the seat of
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the district government and most of the area’s schools, and as the social gathering place for
those coming from the outlying rural communes (Anonymous, personal communication,
11/09/2015). One of said communes is Sakaviro, five kilometers south of town, where I spent a
portion of my study. Sakaviro is in fact a loose collection of five villages: Malalia (where I was
based), Ambalatsilalova, Soalatsena, Visambo, and Ampiafana. The commune has a population
of roughly 1,000. Its inhabitants are farmers and livestock raisers from the Betsileo ethnic group,
which also purportedly makes up about 85% of the population of Ambalavao. It’s an hour’s walk
from Malalia to a larger village along the highway called Iaratsena, and two hours back to
Ambalavao. It is, nevertheless, surprisingly isolated. Health services and education beyond the
primary level are found only in Iaratsena and Ambalavao. Farmers plant rice, corn, and a bevy
of other crops, and raise cattle, pigs, and chickens. Agriculture and animal husbandry are the
only widespread economic activities in any of the five villages, all of which I visited. It is crucial
to note that for the inhabitants of Sakaviro, identities as farmers and pastoralists aren’t mutually
exclusive; rather, they’re crucially complementary to the livelihoods of those who lay claim to
them. The region falls within a tropical highland climate, with more plentiful rain in the north
gradually lessening as one heads south, and again as one heads from east to west. Both
Ambalavao and Sakaviro fall within the relatively rainy southeastern portion of the region, which
seems to have been traditionally conducive to agriculture (Malagasy Ministry of the
Environment, 2006). Ihosy, meanwhile, lies 2 hours southwest along the RN 7 from Ambalavao,
where it serves as the capital of Ihorombe region. With only 1.9% of the national population,
OPHI ranks it as the sixth-poorest of Madagascar’s 22 regions, with an MPI score of 0.448
(Oxford Poverty and Human Development Initiative (2015), p.6). Within Ihorombe, there are
three different microclimates: a dryer climate in the west not unlike the area around Morondava,
a wetter eastern portion similar to the east coast, and an intermediate zone around Ihosy itself.
In the eastern microclimate, agriculture is dependent on the labor of zebu cattle- for transport,
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plowing, fertilizer, etc. In the west of the region, the soil isn’t of the variety that needs tillingpeople grow corn and manioc, which do well even with less water, as well as rice where
irrigation is available. There are more head of cattle in the west than in the east of the region
because of the more favorably flat topography and resulting suitable pasturage (purportedly
some of the best to be found anywhere in the country) (Anonymous, personal communication,
11/20/2015). The region is more economically dependent on cattle raising in its own right than is
the case in Haute Matsiatra, as becomes apparent when one drives through the drier and
largely farmless west of the region. Ihosy serves in a similar capacity to Ambalavao as a town of
exchange for the surrounding area, including as a major national cattle market (routinely
described to me as the third-largest, behind Ambalavao and the western town of
Tsiroanomandidy, which participants alternately listed as the largest.) However, it has recently
witnessed something of a population boom as a result of a sapphire rush in nearby Ilakaka
since the year 2000. When mining doesn’t work out for migrants who arrive in the region to
search for gems, they often stay in the region and enter small-scale commerce in Ihosy. As a
result of this heavy migration, less than 10% of the city’s population of roughly 50,000 (there
hasn’t been a national census in Madagascar since 1993) people are from the Bara ethnic
group, who constitute a large majority in the cattle-raising hinterland of Ihorombe (Anonymous,
November 20, 2015).
Madagascar: Contemporary Political and Economic SituationShortly after a centralized state headed by monarchs of the highland Merina ethnicity gained
control over most of the country in the late 19th century, Madagascar fell under French colonial
rule in 1895. The colonial period was largely characterized by French extraction of natural
resources and a series of policies aimed at bolstering the role of Merina civil servants in
positions of power at the expense of most of the country’s other ethnic groups, known
collectively as côtiers. This tactic of “divide and rule” was used elsewhere in French Africa with
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considerable success, and largely stifled serious Malagasy resistance to colonialism (apart from
a revolt crushed in 1947) until pressure began to mount internationally and in Madagascar for
an end to the colonial project. In 1960, Madagascar achieved independence with the
proclamation of the First Malagasy republic under President Philibert Tsiranana, from 1960 to
1972. This period was remembered as something of a golden age by many of my informants, as
the economy has steadily deteriorated since Tsiranana was forced out of power by national
protests in 1972. There then followed three years of political chaos culminating with the rise to
power in 1975 of a military commander named Didier Ratsiraka, who proclaimed the Second
Republic and subsequently introduced socialist-style collectivization reforms during his long and
undemocratic reign, which culminated in his own ouster in elections spurred by popular protests
in 1993, inaugurating the Third Republic. He won re-election in 1997, but his rule quickly
became unpopular again, and in 2002 another political crisis developed between forces loyal to
President Ratsiraka and the then-Mayor of Antananarivo, Marc Ravalomanana. Ravalomanana
ultimately won out, and implemented a series of free market reforms during his seven year
reign. Losing popularity himself by 2009, he left office during yet another political crisis centered
around the main figure of the opposition, then-Mayor of Antananarivo Andry Rajoelina, who
subsequently inaugurated today’s Fourth Republic. From 2009-2014 Rajoelina presided over a
period of “Transition”, which eventually culminated in the election of the current president, Hery
Rajaonarimampianina. Although the nation has enjoyed some modest periods of economic
growth between each of the numerous crises, every subsequent transition has halted any
nascent progress. National GDP has shrunk considerably since independence, and living
standards declined by 40% between 1971 and 2004 alone (Kull, 2004, p. 30). While it’s difficult
to know the exact numbers because of the lack of any recent census, roughly three quarters of
Madagascar’s population live in rural areas, making agriculture and animal husbandry the
primary means of survival for the large majority of the nation’s population. Foreign investment
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has been hit hard by the crises, and tourism numbers have not yet recovered. Even natural
resource extraction has soured in recent years, with mineral busts, for example, putting many of
Ilakaka’s sapphire miners out of work. Although today’s political situation seems more stable
than it did a few years ago, insecurity has been bemoaned as particularly severe since 2009,
and many of my informants traced a majority of their current ills to that inauspicious year
(Roland Pritchett, personal communication, September 8, 2015).
Cattle System HistoryToday, there are significant populations of cattle in virtually every part of Madagascar. However,
certain groups and regions of the country have, historically, had a more intensive relationship
with herding than others. Campbell (2005, p.29) identifies the Bara, Mahafaly, Antandroy,
Tsimehety and Sakalava peoples as some of the most notable of these. It is crucial to note that
each of these groups had some varying primary conception of cattle as bearers of wealth and
status, rather than as mere conduits for consumption of meat or milk (p.29)3. Crop cultivation
was an indispensable (largely female) activity, but remained a secondary one when compared
to the more socially definitive ownership of cattle. Interestingly, in light of contemporary humancaused brushfires in Malagasy grasslands, while such seasonal fires intended to improve the
growth of fresh grass were common in the savannas, it was the intensity of burning in the
highlands that “resulted in such erosion ‘ as to leave many acres totally inaccessible to cattle’”
(p.29). The Merina king Andraintsimitovy (c. 1650-70) seemed cognizant of the potential scarcity
of cattle in the highlands, and set a limit of 15 cattle to be butchered in each market in his realm
(p.29). Nevertheless, there is a long history of cattle being exported from Madagascar for
foreign consumption. In the early 1800s, 1,350 head were exported to the Mascarenes

3

Several of my informants decried what they perceived to be a novel, harmful over-commercialization of cattle
systems once defined more by their social utility than their profitability (Anonymous, November 19, 2015).
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(Madagascar’s island neighbors) for around $30 a head (Campbell p.184). The Merina state
controlled some 30-40% of the market during this period, but there were, even then, signs of
conflict between the monarchy and herders elsewhere on the island. From 1828-50, the Merina
crown mandated that all cattle intended for religious ritual use be forfeited to imperial
slaughterhouses (Campbell p.186). Additionally, the export of cattle within the considerable
territory of the Merina Empire “was a court monopoly”, and the state made sure to take
advantage. Setting a local price for purchase from herders at $0.0071 a bullock, the state resold
the cattle to foreign merchants on the coast for between $11 and $15 a head (these prices fell
considerably after the French conquest) (Campbell p.184). The scale of cattle export increased
accordingly: 12,000 head to Reunion between 1821-45, 10-12,000 to the Mascarenes in the
50s, 15,000 in the 60s, and so on. By the 1870s, the Bara and Sakalava were themselves doing
a tidy business exporting to South Africa, providing some 80% of Natal Province’s cattle imports
between 1875 and 1909 (Campbell p.185). Around that time there was an explosion of growth in
the export of cattle hides, with American and European traders alternately competing with one
another and colluding together to force down prices, leading to tensions with Merina dealers. By
the 1890s, as many as 200,000 hides a year were leaving Madagascar (Campbell p.188).
Throughout this period, aggressive political and military activity provided some semblance of
order to the often chaotic and dangerous business that was cattle. From the late 18th century,
the Merina monarchy began an era of rapid and determined expansion, which largely
succeeded in spite of the intensity of resistance by the peoples it subjugated. The Merina
conquest of Betsileo in 1814, and seemingly incessant Merina raids on southern cattle herds
(usually undertaken with an eye towards future export) provided the growing state with new
sources of revenue to provide for its rapidly mounting expenses (Campbell p.67). Conversely,
particularly during the Franco-Merina War of 1883-85, Sakalava and Bara pastoralists furiously
resisted Merina incursions and launched their own counter-raids deep into the imperial
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heartland (Campbell p.336). Despite its foundations as a fundamentally agricultural state, the
Merina state became heavily invested in cattle raising, as is made clear by its insistent control of
exports outlined above. Merina kings and queens became major cattle patrons in their own
right4, embracing the relatively novel form of wealth brought to their attention by territorial
expansion into cattle-dependent regions. Accordingly, the monarchy began implementing harsh
penalties against cattle thieves, including the potential reduction of the offender to slave status,
a year in prison for every head of cattle stolen, and capital punishment, according to the
situation’s demands. (Rakoto 2011). However, an increase in military conflict in the 1880s,
particularly with the French, began to erode the state’s capacity to enforce these penalties, in
part because of its inability to adequately fill its rural military garrisons. As a result, cattle theft
sky rocketed in the 1880s, particularly in the West and in the central Highlands. Indeed, state
functionaries were routinely complicit in this theft. A letter from the London Missionary Society to
the Malagasy Prime Minister chastises these officials, claiming that ” ‘servants of senior officials
responsible in principle for keeping their herds , are transforming themselves into veritable
robbers , plundering and enraging entire regions…’” (Rakoto 2011). Rakoto identifies this period
of military turmoil and state as a cause of the proliferation of dina law, a sort of informal
communal pact in rural Madagascar, in this case outlining how to arbitrate and settle cases of
cattle theft. He contrasts the rise of this legal tradition with the implementation of formalist
French colonial law after 1895. France seems to have played something of a dualistic role in the
cattle economy during the colonial era. Kaufmann (2008) examines the well-intentioned mess
created by overconfident French administrators in attempting to eradicate cactus in the
country’s southwest in hopes of improving the health and number of cattle in the region. The
case marks an example of an overconfidently “modernist” state convinced of the merit of its own
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This role of the central, Tana-based state as patron continues up to the present: when I asked one market insider
who the most powerful patron in Ihosy was, he chuckled and replied “Ça, c’est l’état”.
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technical solutions heavy-handedly disrupting a more or less balanced system governed by
local knowledge5. The French involved themselves on a limited scale in the cattle economy
through the establishment of massive colonial ranches, although the majority of these were
broken up after Independence (Kull, 2004, p.29). While an ad-hoc French legal system was
initially ineffective in combatting cattle theft, a delegation of power to mostly-Malagasy staffed
tribunals tasked with ruling on what the French considered petty crime in 1946 was, to Rakoto,
behind a sharp decline in the rate of cattle theft in the 1950s. It must be noted, however, that the
dina system continued to function normally alongside the formal French system. In the years
after independence, new and localized dina conventions were promulgated in so-called boky
mavo (yellow books) in the face of various states of independence. An informant in Ihosy
connected to the dina process explained to me that dina has traditionally worked in coordination
with local representatives of state institutions, namely authorities within the rural commune and
fokontany (Anonymous, November 23, 2015).
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Figure 1: Historical Cycle of Cattle System Volatility
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This bears an eerie resemblance to the deleterious anti-fire policies propagated by the Malagasy state in Kull’s
Isle of Fire (2004).
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History of Bara and Betsileo AreasAs early as the 1640s, the French traveler Etienne de Flacourt tells of a king of Ibara,
Andriamanely, who began to build “a cattle empire” in the savannas of the south (Kent 1970,
p.139-40). Well before that, though, there were political entities in southern Madagascar rising
and falling on their respective prowess in the raiding and trading of cattle, often intended for
foreign export and consumption. Extended family-based political units known as raza were
founded upon the possession of “a great deal of cattle…This is a kind of belief in predestination
that compels one to be successful on Earth…in its own way it acts as a powerful economic
incentive” (Kent 1962, p.30-31). While Bara political units often had short life spans, major clans
served as reserves of identity and social organization. Similarly, Bara kings, while often limited
in the temporal extent of their power, played important roles as regulators of cattle looting and
internecine crime. Kent (1962) speculates that there may have been a centralized Bara political
unit at one point, but this was certainly not the case by the mid-19th century. In fact, the
dependence of Bara clan-kingdoms upon revenue from both war and cattle taken as fines for
breaking the law caused volatile expansion and consolidation among Bara royal families
struggling to maintain their status on the basis of a uniquely mobile form of wealth- cattle. The
continual fragmentation of political units made it difficult for interested members of these units to
obtain community approval for foreign wars, therefore further exacerbating the depth of the
need for more cattle (Kent 1970 p.148). Despite these internal divisions, outsiders had
considerable trouble exerting control over Ibara. Refugees fleeing Merina expansion elsewhere
augmented the numbers of Bara clans and warriors, leading to reprisals against the very areas
they had fled (Kent 1970 p.124). The Merina managed to maintain a fragile garrison at Ihosy,
but the Briton James Richardson found 96% of its soldiers missing in 1877, being supposedly
“elsewhere on trading ventures” (Campbell p.165). The French struggled for years to gain
control over the region despite their technological advantages (Kent 1970 p.124). Interactions
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with outsiders were economic in nature as well as conflictual, however. In Bara country,
between 1607 and 1614, “ ‘there started the trade for rifles, imported by the English, 14 to 16
head going for one of them’ ” (Kent 1970). For their part, the Betsileo are described by Campbell
as having been relative latecomers to intensive cattle raising, with the practice having taken root
by 1810, much later than was the case in Ibara (p.29). Kent (1962) implies that the Betsileo
were the most pliant and successful subjects of the rising Merina state, quoting a British
observer as describing their conquest by the Merina as “[having been] one of vast improvement
for the Betsileo. They now have peace and security, which they never had under their former
government.” (p.29). This does not seem to be in keeping with the events of 1811, when the
Merina King Radama I took the Betsileo town of Ambalavao, whose population chose to commit
collective suicide rather than submit to his rule (B. Rabarijoana, personal communication,
November 23, 2015)6. While it is also worth noting the reputation of the Betsileo as stalwart
farmers (B. Rabarijoana, personal communication, November 23, 2015, Kent, 1962, p.29), it is
crucial to underline the fact that this has not precluded the development of cattle rearing as an
integral aspect of their broader agricultural processes, in addition to the other roles of cattle
which I have already outlined (at least in southern Betsileo, where Sakaviro and Ambalavao are
located).
Theoretical Background-The Economics of PastoralismHatfield and Davies (2006) define pastoralism as “any predominantly livestock-based production
system that is mainly extensive in nature and uses some form of mobility of
livestock…regardless of the extent to which it contributes to the household
economy…Pastoralism is an adaptation to marginal environments, characterized by climatic

6

Not to mention informal conversations I had with Betsileo people fiercely proud of their separate identity from
the Merina.
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uncertainty and low-grade resources. It has considerable economic value and latent potential in
the drylands, and is central to the livelihoods and wellbeing of millions of the worlds poor.”
(Hatfield and Davies (2006) p.1, 6). While Haute Matsiatra and Ihorombe do indeed depend
upon agriculture to varying degrees, the interviews I conducted (particularly in the rural context
of Sakaviro) left me convinced that my informants were themselves classifiable as pastoralists.
While agriculture, as was stated above, has long functioned in Madagascar’s cattle belt largely
as a subsistence-level activity, cattle raising fulfills a number of crucial social and economic
roles in the areas under study. Both within and beyond the Malagasy context, it may be helpful
to examine four aspects of the pastoralist experience which became particularly salient over the
course of this project:
1. The Intuitive System: Although pastoralism is often seen by outsiders, particularly
national governments, as an irrational and marginal economic activity, Hatfield and
Davies argue that it is often in the fact the only rational economic activity in many of the
more arid parts of the world, both in terms of production and of environmental
management (Hatfield and Davies, 2006, p.1). The intuitiveness of cattle raising in
marginal environments is becoming apparent in the increasingly dry regions of Haute
Matsiatra and Ihorombe where this project took place.
2. Mobile Banking- Livestock function as reserves of wealth in areas where sufficient
agricultural surpluses are scarce, and where the workings of industrialized and urban
economies can seem alien. In a cash economy like Madagascar’s, livestock products
have value for those outside of pastoralist economies, and thus can be used by herders
to make enough money to buy other goods- food, private schooling, medicine, etc.
However, for those who depend upon livestock to function in this capacity, their utility is
only as good as the system doing the conversion. Similarly to what I found in my
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discussions with market informants knowledgeable of the workings of the national cattle
supply chain:
In pastoral areas, asset wealth is often high, if volatile, but markets do not enable pastoralists to convert
that wealth at times of stress. Food entitlement failure in this case can also be considered market failure:
high transaction costs, poor information flow to producers, lack of competition in supply of goods and
services and inability to choose the time of sale, because of an absence of alternatives for investment of
the wealth generated. Selling livestock during favourable periods can often generate significant revenue,
but this can be of limited value when few goods or services are provided that could make relevant and
safe investments. Instead, the safest place to store wealth is on the hoof, where the returns to investment
are substantial during good times, but with the inevitable downfall that its value is eroded at exactly the
time when it is most useful. (Hatfield and Davies, 2006, p.4)

3. (Unequally) Linked- Despite the tendency of many outside observers to treat pastoralism
as an isolated system, livestock raising is usually integrally linked to national and global
economies. That being said, these links are often skewed in favor of outside buyers,
rather than the pastoralists themselves (this is very much the case in Madagascar, as
both prices and profits steadily rise for the host of middlemen operating between the
herder and the eventual consumption market): “ Many pastoralists face constraints in
realising the economic potential of their system owing to high transaction costs, such as
long distances to processing plants, absence of formal markets, poor access to
information and fair contracts, lack of financial services such as credit facilities, and
excessive government bureaucracy and fees.” (Hatfield and Davies 2006). Pastoralist’s
own primary production systems have become maddeningly difficult for them to access:
“Kenya provides one such example, where it is estimated that pastoralists should be
obtaining up to 70% of terminal livestock prices but in reality they are only averaging
40% (Kibue, 2005). Ethiopia presents a similar picture, where the proportion of
transaction costs and service fees at the municipal market in Addis Ababa including
broker fees is equivalent to an astounding 17% of the purchase price of a steer, 29% of
a Bullock/oxen and 27% of a barren cow. It is little surprise that producers seek
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alternative markets or that smuggling of live animals, hides and skins from Ethiopia into
neighbouring countries is costing the treasury an estimated US$100 million each year
(BBC, 2001). Illegal trade reflects the cost of going the legal route.” (Hatfield and Davies
2006). Indeed, this lack of proper access to the selfsame systems that depend upon the
production of pastoralists is largely to blame for the tendency of producers to seek out
illicit systems in hopes of benefitting more from their own production.
4. States Just Don’t UnderstandMuch of the exodus of livestock producers from the formal sector can be chalked up to
senseless overregulation of markets characterized by thin profit margins to begin with:
“Instead of facilitating this trade to stimulate local economies, and investing in those
economies, governments tend to impose tariffs and restrictions that ensure the trade
remains in the informal, or black market, sector, relying on bribes at border posts where
necessary.” (Hatfield and Davies, 2006, p.13). This acknowledgment of the often corrupt
and counterproductive role of government in pastoralist supply chains will prove
prescient, as we shall see. Frequently though, government’s unintentional and
intentional marginalization of pastoralist economies goes well beyond simple market
failures: “The perception that pastoralism does not produce significant economic gain
means that many governments fail to make the necessary public investments in market
infrastructure, roads, security, education and human and institutional capacity building”
(Hatfield and Davies, 2006, p.16). More often in southern Madagascar, this lack of
investment can take on an ethnic overtone, particularly for those from the Bara ethnic
group, as is detailed below.
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Findings: The Malagasy Cattle Economy
Over the course of my research, I was given a mountain of information about the structural
workings of the Malagasy cattle economy, information which varied widely depending on the
region and institutional affiliation of the speaker. This variation makes it difficult to provide a
representative summary of the system and how it works, but this is what I have come up with.
Cattle raising is particularly important in southern, middle-western, and northern Madagascar,
namely in the Sava, Sofia, Menabe, Bongolava, Antsimo Andrefana, Antandroy, Anosy, Haute
Matsiatra, and Ihorombe regions, although arguments could be made for the inclusion of others.
In the formal sector, the cattle are mainly transported by truck from the major cattle markets to
slaughterhouses in major cities with high beef consumption, like Tana or Tamatave. In the west,
four or five smaller market towns in the hinterland converge on Tsiroanomandidy, the
Ambalavao equivalent for western herders, after which they’re sent directly on their way to
Tana. Many cattle are also driven on foot to Mahitsy, just west of Tana, where butchers and
slaughterhouse operators from the capital come to make their selections. For cattle coming from
the north, the Ambalavao equivalent is Mampikony, but this sees the smallest volume of the
major markets. In the experience of a former buyer, the slaughterhouse buyers from Tana
worked the dry season from April to September in the Ambalavao markets, and the rainy
season from October to March out west. During my time in the south, this seasonal divide was
palpable in the markets both at Ambalavao and Ihosy, where November volume is considered
particularly low this year (Anonymous, November 3, 2015). Indeed, beyond mere seasonal
fluctuations in volume, the market is often dependent upon drought conditions in the far south
(Antandroy, Anosy, Atsimo Andrefana), which, when severe enough, lead to a rush on the
market by southerners desperate for cash to supplement their failing food crops. An official in
the Ambalavao market showed me a graph of market activity appearing to confirm the existence
of such a boom and bust cycle in keeping with severe southern droughts between 2009-11
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(Anonymous, November 12, 2015). As droughts have become more and more common, there
have been fairly regular gluts of the market in September and October as desperate
southerners sell their bulls. Buyers know this, and take the opportunity to profit from the
desperation of the vendors, as prices tumble because of the high supply. A former buyer from
Tana outlined the major links in the cattle economy like this: zebu are typically driven on foot out
of the deep south (Antandroy, Anosy, and Atsimo Andrefana) to the towns of Betroka, for the
center-south and Sakaraha for the south-west. From there, the two chains merge on the
national highway at Ihosy, and are driven by truck to Ambalavao, Madagascar’s largest cattle
market and where most major buyers come to buy southern cattle on Wednesday and
Thursdays. That being said, the traditional primacy of the Ambalavao market has been steadily
eroded since improvements to the road from Ambalavao to Ihosy were made in 1989
(Anonymous, November 21, 2015). One Ambalavao informant expressed his fear that if the
municipal government continues to “badly manage”7 the market, Ihosy will supersede
Ambalavao as the southern cattle marker of choice. At one point, tensions over the shifting roles
of the two towns led to a summit between the mayors of Ambalavao and Ihosy in an attempt to
find some sort of equilibrium between the markets through a delineation of “rights of place”
(Anonymous, November 12, 2015). As it stands, though, there are many dahalo between Ihosy
and Ambalavao, and transporting cattle by truck between the two gives the patrons (a word that
arises everywhere, signifying the southern men who own large herds of most of the cattle that
are sold here) growing reason to worry. The patrons would prefer to stay in Ihosy because
they’re afraid to make the journey, whether for fear of their own safety or that of their cattle
(Anonymous, November 9, 2015). Conversely, buyers from the north are reluctant to journey
directly to Ihosy, even though prices there are considerably lower there (and even lower at
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Sakaraha, which is where one of my informants from Ambalavao journeys each Friday to make
his purchases for re-sale to northern buyers.) As a result of this reluctance on the part of cattle
merchants to change their buying and selling habits, Ambalavao limps on despite a sizable drop
in its volume: on a typical market week today, each market might process somewhere between
6 and 700 head a piece, about half of Ambalavao’s prior traffic, although this fluctuates
according to seasonal and drought conditions (Anonymous, November 12, 2015). There are a
few major types of players at work at any given time in market dealings in either Ambalavao or
Ihosy. The chain was (hypothetically) outlined to me in this way by an informant in Ambalavao:
Player 1 lives in Sakaraha, and has 500 head of cattle. He gives Player 2 100 head at a given
price, say 100 ariary (again hypothetical). There’s a deadline on this beneficence: Player 2 has
to repay Player 1 with a fixed sum on a fixed day, say a week from when he receives them. He
cannot avoid this, even if he takes a huge hit at the market and makes less than Player 1,
whose profit is guaranteed. Player 2 is based in Ihosy, maybe. He finds Player 3 in Ambalavao.
He steeply raises the price per head compared to what he is paying Player 1. Why is all of this
necessary? Because Patron 1 has no desire to work without an intermediary. Anyways, Player 3
ups the price again and heads to the Ambalavao market with this stock. The majority of the men
working in the market are known as panera, or démarcheurs in French. It is they who approach
the sellers coming from the south on behalf of the buyers coming from the north. At the market,
panera approach Player 3 and haggle over the price, which, mind you, has risen considerably
by this point. The panera make very, very little off of the transaction. Rather the profits flow back
proportionally back up the chain: Player 1 makes more than Player 2, and so on. In this case,
Player 2 and 3 are what I heard referred to as panao hira kely, the guys who are buying low in
southern markets and Ihosy and selling high to buyers in Ambalavao. Of course, Patron 1 is a
patron, a wealthy cattle owner (usually with hundreds or even thousands of head of cattle) from
somewhere in the south who prefers to do business through intermediaries and thus guarantee
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himself a fixed profit, as outlined above. (Anonymous, November 12, 2015). With the cattle
decline, however, there are fewer and fewer true patrons, and an increasing concentration of
cattle among those who have managed to protect their herd sizes. However, while these actors
(and outside ones discussed in greater detail below) are integral parts of the system in which
they operate, it is also important to recognize the positive spillover effects of the existence of
cattle markets on the communities which host them. I was told repeatedly in both Ambalavao
and Ihosy that the strength of the entire local economy was integrally tied to that of the cattle
markets. If volume is down and fewer people come to town to participate in the market, fewer
people will buy and sell other things in the general market elsewhere in the town. In places
without much secondary industry, the presence of a consistent excuse to exchange things is of
vital importance. While it is, therefore, worth mentioning the role the markets play in towns
themselves, it is the small-scale herders outside of the markets who make the economy
function, and as such merit some discussion.
The Role of Cattle in the Rural Context
In every village, town, and city in Madagascar, there is a localized and wholly unique role to be
played by cattle. That reality was impressed upon me by the variety and nuance in the ways that
omby were used even among Sakaviro’s five villages, let alone large and diverse regions like
Haute Matsiatra and Ihorombe. It is more than likely that conducting this project with the same
sets of questions in a different region of Madagascar would have yielded different answers.
However, while it is important to note this fundamental locality of cattle, there do seem to be a
few constants. In understanding just how crucial livestock are to Malagasy families in rural
areas, my opportunity to study in Haute Matsiatra’s Sakaviro commune was invaluable. There, I
was given the same list of importances of omby in daily life with such regularity that my
translator and I had to suppress our laughter when we posed the question in our later
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interviews: the zebu is used to work the land for crops, to fertilize the fields, and to pull carts.
When someone dies, you kill a zebu for people to eat at their funeral, and sell another to pay for
the funeral itself- the same goes for holidays like famadihana. The zebu serves as a kind of
bank- if you have zebu and you need money for medicine or school fees, for instance, you sell
one (Anonymous, November 16, 2015). Beyond these immediately utilitarian uses, however,
cattle play more subtle but equally vital roles. These were often most apparent in speaking with
farmers who had none. In the village of Soalatsena, I met two such men. The first was in his
50s, and had had his family’s herd of 70 head of cattle stolen by “adversaries” when he was a
boy (the resulting tribunal case was marred by the excesses of some corrupt magistrates).
Without zebu of his own to plow the fields, he relies on borrowing cattle from other members of
his community. The number of cattle in the village as a whole has steeply decline in recent
years, with such intensity that few villagers are active in Ambalavao’s market anymore-they
need the cattle they have left to work the land, nothing more (Anonymous, November 16, 2015).
Another man I spoke with was in his late 70s, and had once had as many as 30 head of zebu.
Poverty forced him to sell those 10 years ago, and now he must rely on loans to pay for things
like medical costs. He says that zebu are about status: if one has many, one is a respected
man; without them, he is beneath the man who has more. Without zebu reserves, he can only
make money by selling his crops (Anonymous, November 16,, 2015). It is in contingency-type
situations like this that one begins to realize the true extent of the social reliance upon cattle in
this part of the country. In case of a bad harvest, agropastoralists here can sell their zebu (as
was discussed in the case of the far south) to buy enough food to make up for the harvest. To
be sure, there are surplus harvests in certain years. Without cattle to invest in, however, one is
forced to keep a reserve of cash in the house (which may not last in a run of bad harvests),
losing the ability to grow the money and improve one’s circumstances. I spoke with a
representative of Ambalavao’s only microfinance agency, who told me that most of his 350-400
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clients came from town or the immediate area-most farmers and livestock raisers farmer afield
did not meet qualifications for participation in their programs because they weren’t producing
enough to be counted as a “personal economic activity.” In other words, the agency did not
make loans to subsistence farmers of herders. He also informed me that the three banks
located in town were used almost exclusively by patrons processing payments from the cattle
market and state functionaries working in town (Anonymous, November 12, 2015). With formal
sector banking options unavailable to the population, farmers’ best investment option is
something always in demand, which can be relatively quickly replenished: cattle. It is useful
here to speak in terms of the existence of a “poverty trap”, or a progressively worsening set of
circumstances preventing the poor from escaping poverty (indeed, worsening its existing
effects). The findings of Thomas and Gaspart (2014) speak to the existence of this phenomenon
in rural Madagascar. One can observe the existence of the trap in the examples of farmers who
have managed to prosper because of their zebu. In the village of Visambo, I met a farmer who
currently owns 14 omby. He once had 30, but he sold most of them to pay for life’s needs- to
build his house, for instance. He goes to the cattle market every week, where he engages in a
practice common among many of the small-herders I met: he buys some of the smallest
available zebu, raises them to a larger size for 4 or 5 years, and sells them back at a profit. In
this way, he’s constantly growing his herd, and by extension his financial reserves. Note that
although his herd is smaller than before, he’s converted some of that wealth into more-difficultto-acquire sorts of investments; a house, for instance. Another man had a similar story, but had
sold most of his 20 head to pay for private schooling in Ambalavao for his children. It becomes
increasingly apparent just how indispensable zebu are in places like Sakaviro: for people who
routinely told me that the national government had virtually no presence in their area and that
they had no access to formal sector financial services, the most effective safety net against
illness, death, and crop failure is cattle. The importance also becomes apparent in speaking with
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people concerning their access to quality health and education services. While there is a public
primary school in Sakaviro, participants routinely expressed their belief that state schools were
of an inferior quality, and those with the means to do so sent their children to private schools in
Ambalavao. Because of the distance, this also usually meant renting a room for the kids to stay
in during the week, rather than walking four hours round-trip each day (Anonymous, November
14, 2015). Similarly, a hospital stay or a much-needed medicine was likely to be well out of the
quotidian price range of rural inhabitants, so access to these services usually demands that a
bull be sold, repeatedly in the case of school fees. For the wealthier inhabitants of Sakaviro, the
ability to afford health and education services (largely provided by profits from selling cattle)
makes the difference in avoiding the poverty trap that some of my other informants found
themselves in. Finally, the consequences of not having zebu could be most dire in the lack of an
ability to invest in the agricultural inputs upon which people there depend for daily life. Without
the use of manure for fertilizer, for instance, farmers face the difficult choice of spending scarce
funds on synthetic fertilizer or watching yields decline in land that seems to be getting drier by
the year. (Anonymous, November 10, 2015)
Decline: Causes, Effects, and ManifestationsAs I mentioned towards the beginning of this paper, I was given serious reason to doubt the
validity of statistical estimates on the number of cattle anywhere in Madagascar. This makes it
difficult to know the exact scale of what I was repeatedly told is unfolding today: a sharp decline
in the number of cattle nationwide. That being said, I heard various numbers from my informants
which seemed to be sufficient cause for alarm: Officials at the Ambalavao market told me that
the number of head in a typical Wednesday-Thursday market has changed dramatically since
2000, when Ambalavao consistently sold 1,400 head a week. Now, it’s closer to 6-700
(Anonymous, November 12, 2015). Ihosy officials largely echoed these lamentations: whereas
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in the 1980s there were around five cattle for every inhabitant, the number today hovers around
0.25 (Anonymous, November 23, 2015). The existence of a decline was confirmed by nearly all
of my informants, in Sakaviro as well as in the towns. It’s manifesting itself in a variety of ways.
One is smaller herd sizes, both nationally and regionally. While I routinely heard of farmers who
once had 50-70 head of cattle and Sakaviro, I met none who had more than 15 today
(Anonymous, November 14, 15, 16, 2015). A prominent panao hira kely at the Ihosy market told
me that whereas he once routinely took 200 head of cattle to Ambalavao each week, today he
rarely reached 180 because of the sheer scarcity (Anonymous, November 19, 2015). Even the
once-mythic herds of the grands patrons of the Grand Sud are rumored to be smaller than
before: the former buyer from Tana told me that the bovine population of Betroka was 60,000
when he was a kid, but this has fallen to 35,000 today. The lack of formal statistical evidence
seems to be more than offset by the burden of evidence provided by the consistency of
participants’ confirmation that the decline exists. The following sections will unpack the causes
and effects of this precipitous decline as it concerns the lives of those who depend most on
cattle.
The D-Word: Thieves & OmbyThis paper is, quite consciously, not about the dahalo phenomenon.8 That being said, any
discussion of cattle today, especially as concerns the decline, would be woefully incomplete
without some sort of treatment of the issue. In doing so, I’ll largely rely on the accounts provided
by people I spoke with at all three of my sites. While cattle theft is by no means a recent
development in Madagascar (see historical discussion above), participants usually felt that the
situation had become exacerbated sometime in the recent past. Often, this exacerbation was

8

For a few recent and diverse examinations of the phenomenon see McNair’s 2008 Romancing Dahalo, Tarabey’s
2012 Madagascar Dahalo, and Scheideker’s 2014 Cattle, Conflict, and Gendarmes in Southern Madagascar.
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associated with a particular political event: the 2009 crisis, the 2002 crisis, the rise of President
Ratsiraka, the fall of President Ratsiraka, the fall of President Zafy Albert, etc. Regardless, the
result of these crises has been increasing lawlessness in rural areas throughout the country,
particularly in the south. The ways in which this lawlessness was explained tended to take on a
few specific forms. First and foremost among these was the perceived deepening of intense
poverty in rural areas, often manifesting itself in astronomical unemployment rates for young
men (Anonymous, November 9, 11, 2015). The accompanying deterioration of living standards
will be further discussed below. Second was a conflation of dahalo activity with the Bara
ethnicity. Traditionally, Bara men have had a custom of stealing a bull or two from a prospective
bride’s family to prove themselves as men. This practice was often referred to as a “game” or a
“sport”. (Anonymous, November 9, 2015). However, the custom is increasingly seen (invariably
by non-Bara informants) as having “degraded” into theft, with rising rates of violence against
cattle owners and their property. While many participants ascribed this degradation to
Madagascar’s deepening poverty, a large portion attributed it directly to Bara culture, particularly
when I spoke to people in Ambalavao. To them, the Bara stole for custom or for “pleasure”. The
Betsileo, by contrast, had no choice but to steal, often to pay for school fees for themselves and
their children (Anonymous, November 11, 2015). This division between studious Betsileo and
hedonistic Bara was equally present in the minds of officials coming from other parts of the
country (Anonymous, November 11, 2015). Even as thieves, the Betsileo people I spoke to
differentiated strongly between themselves and their Bara counterparts: “Guys here are small,
but strong. For the Betsileo, if you have to work you have to work. If you have to fight you have
to fight. In the south the guys are big, but afraid to die. Betsileo aren’t!” (Anonymous, November
13, 2015). Interestingly, I heard several young people describe the indispensable working
relationships between Bara and Betsileo dahalo. Dahalo rarely come from the immediate areas
they steal from. Rather, a contact from within a village will contact a known dahalo from far
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away, and act as a sort of guide for the assault, providing information on the best directions to
approach from, members of the community with guns, etc. The motivation for this betrayal of
one’s own community (frequently, even of one’s own family) was attributed not to the portion of
the profits given to the informant, but to rampant jealousy of either wealth or romantic partners
within rural villages (Anonymous, November 19, 2015). This jealousy will be examined in
greater details, but for now suffice to say that dahalo operate over long distances, almost
invariably with a local partner. Crucially, my participants repeatedly underlined the existence of
dahalo activity as contingent on high demand for stolen cattle. There are different illegal
networks crisscrossing the country, each known to some, but not all, of the informants in a
particular market. There are two major endgames for these networks: the reselling of stolen
cattle back into legitimate markets with false papers, and the direct clandestine export of these
cattle on the coasts. Insiders in both Ambalavao and Ihosy confirmed the presence of large
numbers of stolen cattle in the markets they worked in. (Anonymous, November 12, 19, 2015).
For the grands patrons largely responsible for buying stolen cattle, (at much reduced prices:
thieves have little desire to hold on to their stolen merchandise with angry villagers and
gendarmes tracking them, and so lose much of their bargaining power to the well-insulated
patrons. The regulatory process at both markets works something like this: Upon arrival from
the south, sellers must stop at a checkpoint staffed by representatives of the gendarmerie, the
urban commune in which the market is located, and the national police. Each bull is require to
have an identity card called a FIB (Fiche Identitaire Bovin), detailing its personal history and
previous owners. Each owner has a “cattle passport”, listing the physical description and origins
of the cattle they are looking to sell. Before leaving their own district, they need to receive
paperwork approval from a rural “delegate” of the state. They also need approval of the cattle’s
vaccination records from a private veterinarian employed by the state. Theoretically, finding
discrepancies in the paperwork will allow officials to catch resold stolen cattle in the market and
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punish their owners. In reality, I heard every step of this process described as corrupt by
multiple informants. False papers are generated by the “delegates”, sending indistinguishably
false FIBs and passports on to the checkpoints just before the markets. Controllers at the
markets are often aware of the falsity of the papers they’re receiving, and charge sellers steep
bribes for the right to use them or to replace “lost” ones. Vets are infamous for falsifying
vaccinations records and reaping massive benefits in illegal payments (one informant quipped
that you find the town vet by finding her three cars) (Anonymous, November 9, 2015). In any
case, while all participants seemed to be aware of the presence of stolen cattle in the market,
few seem to have any qualms about dealing with them, especially as they’re often practically
untraceable after having been sold 5-10 times before they reach market (Anonymous,
November 19, 2015). The other major artery of the illicit traffic consists of the driving of cattle to
various points on the coasts, often in conjunction with foreign buyers. While I was informed of
the existence of a dizzying number of these networks, suffice to say that there are major ones
being run from Toliara to South Africa, from Farafagana to China, from Mahajanga to the
Comoros and Mauritius, and from illegal (usually Chinese-owned) slaughterhouses in Ihosy,
Tana, and Toamasina. Insiders often blamed these illegal operations for buying up the rapidly
depleting stock within the formal markets as well as the informal ones, exhausting the system
before it can replenish itself and pushing out Malagasy buyers in the process. While it must be
added that a number of legitimate foreign meat processors seem to be doing busy in Ihosy and
Ambalavao, at least according to market officials there, the end results of high-volume foreign
involvement in the formal sector are the same (Anonymous, November 21, 2015). As concerns
the thieves themselves, participants identified as young adults from rural areas, deprived of
economic and educational opportunity, craving the pleasures of life in town, and often fresh from
finishing a stint in the Malagasy military. While it’s relatively easy to construct a profile of the
typical thief, the young people I spoke with differed as to the eventual uses of the profits from

Myers 38
heists. A university student from Ambalavao described the need to me for a number of his
classmates to participate in cattle theft to pay high tuition rates (I was also told of the exorbitant
bribes often required to get in to university courses, the cost of which begins at a price very
much out of reach for the vast majority of rural families) (Anonymous, November 9, 2015). At
the same time, another youth in Ambalavao emphasized the overriding desire to “have fun in
life”, with many informants outlining the use of money for alcohol and “pleasure” (Anonymous,
November 12, 2015). Regardless of the historical persistence of dahalo activity (which
participants rarely emphasized, at least not before the 1970s), there was a pervasive sentiment
throughout my interviews that deepening poverty and young people looking to “have fun in life”
were responsible for a serious escalation of the practice and its violence. The degree to which
this reflects broader panic as to the degradation of rural living standards is open to debate, but
the presence of theft has clearly had some alarming effects on the whole of the system.
Because possessing large numbers of big bulls makes farmers more conspicuous targets for
theft, many herders have nervously begun to sell their herds, a once secure form of wealth
which has started to look increasingly liquid. (Anonymous, November 10, 2015). The most
compelling evidence of this , for me, was my experience with herds which were invariably
smaller than what was described to me as “normal”: 5-10 cattle instead of 20-40, or even 50100. Desperately seeking to protect their vulnerable (and often only) assets, many communities
have begun to hire “jama”, sorcerer figures from the southeast of the country who are purported
to be impervious to bullets. One source said that these had been increasingly effective in
deterring theft, but that “impostors” were arriving in equal numbers to swindle communities
desperate for protection (Anonymous, November 9, 2015).
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StressAs the most frequently mentioned cause of decline, better understanding the reasons behind
theft was crucial to my understanding of the roots of decline. However, perhaps more
informative were the reasons behind the intimately-linked decline in the health of the cattle
system and general living standards outlined to me by informants in Sakaviro, and largely
echoed by government officials within the Ministry of Livestock. I contend that the three largest
manifestations of physical “stress” outlined to me by the people I spoke with constitute an
interconnected whole: this means poverty, environmental pressures, and population growth
straining a system already weakened by social cohesion problems, institutional weakness, and
theft (the former two are outlined further below.) As Bremner et al (2010) acknowledge, the
existing body of research on the relationships between population, environmental degradation,
and poverty remains tenuous, although there has been a lot of research indicating the existence
of some relationship between these variables. Regardless of the formal theoretical body of
evidence, my repeated brush-ins with these variables in conversations with my informants
seems, to me, sufficient reason to consider them collectively. As we shall see, there are
linkages between the three in the minds of participants which inform their understanding of a life
that seems to be becoming increasingly difficult.
PovertyAllusions to increasingly entrenched poverty were blunt and widespread throughout the
interview process. While the effects of “technical unemployment” are readily apparent in the
streets of Ambalavao and Ihosy (a local government official told me that there were now throngs
of beggars in town for the first time in living memory) (Anonymous, November 19, 2015). there
remain significantly greater economic opportunities (typically, it seemed to me, centering on
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informal, small-scale commerce) in the cattle towns than in the rural areas populated by herders
themselves. The existence of deepening poverty in rural Ihorombe and Haute Matsiatra has had
direct repercussions on cattle decline and, in turn, has been exacerbated by the effects of
consequences stemming from the diminution itself. While theft has already been explored as
one of these, it by no means stands alone. With decreasing recourse to cattle as a financial
service, informants felt increasingly nervous about their susceptibility to bad harvests, deaths,
and cases of bad luck (Anonymous, November 16, 2015). Conversely, the effects of deepening
poverty among small herders have had apparently detrimental effects on the health of the cattle
system as a whole. Less and less able to adopt their well-worn strategy of buying small cattle,
raising them for 4 or 5 years, and reselling them at a profit (and in doing so “absorbing” and hold
large numbers of cattle in the rural hinterlands), farmers are increasingly powerless to stop the
effective liquidation of herds by larger buyers from foreign companies or domestic
slaughterhouses. Of course, poverty has forced herders to sell their cattle below easily
replaceable levels, pushing many into a poverty trap. There were some apparent nuances in
the manifestation of that process between the two regions of study; while farmers in Haute
Matsiatra had the benefit of recourse to relatively robust agricultural systems in the event of a
loss of cattle wealth, there are large swathes of Ihorombe in which, according to officials from
the Ministry of Livestock there, this would be a considerably less viable alternative. This
illustrates the critical role played by climate and soil fertility in efforts to avoid descending into
poverty traps.
Environmental StressFor many of those with whom I spoke in Sakaviro, a new headache has begun to arise: shifting
climatic and environmental conditions have placed an added strain on already marginal
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livelihoods. The most immediately apparent manifestation of climate change in Madagascar9, at
least according to the farmers currently experiencing it, has been a marked decrease in rainfall
in recent years (Anonymous, November 16, 17, 2015). The results of this have been rather
paradoxical. While crops yields are generally lower than they were ten or twenty years ago
(forcing those who have cattle to sell them to make up harvest deficits more frequently than has
traditionally been the case), one poor informant in the village of Soalatsena told me that the rain
has resulted in a lack of “good omby food”. This has prompted many to convert less productive
pasturage into crop land, reducing the area’s carry capacity for zebu. While this adaptation
allows farmers to get the most out of their land in the short term, it reduces the strength of their
four-hooved safety nets. As far as crop yields are concerned, meanwhile, the decline in recent
years has forced those with cattle to sell large portions of their herds and those without them to
try to find work as hired hands in neighboring fields in an effort to make enough cash to buy
enough food to compensate for their meager returns (Anonymous, November 16, 2015). In the
Ihorombe region, meanwhile, farmers have watched in horror as hailstorms have mounted in
intensity (destroying many crops just a week before my arrival) and locusts who typically stop
briefly on their way further north have begun to lay eggs and settle in to demolish precious fields
(Anonymous, November 20, 2015). Livestock Ministry officials also confessed their anxiety to
me about the malnutrition of many of the zebu coming to market in recent years (evident in
every visible bovine ribcage), largely as a result of the degradation of the region’s famous
pasturage by a combination drought and brushfires (Anonymous November 19, 2015).
However, as Christian Kull writes in Isle of Fire, his examination of the brushfire phenomenon in
rural Madagascar, such fires are often the result of carefully taken, historically informed
decisions by Malagasy herders familiar with the particular needs of their rangelands (Kull, 2004,

9

The deleterious effects of which are modeled (with particularly grave consequences for crop yields in the south)
by Vololona et al. (2012)
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p.272). While there certainly is evidence that irresponsible burning can lead to heavy erosion,
Kull notes that “the most realistic stance is that there has always been fire in Madagascar, there
always will be, and there always should be” (p.270). Unfortunately, one finds in the nation’s
current anti-fire policy the same incessantly modernist state outlook (focused on formal,
rationalized “solutions” to incomprehensibly local phenomena) described by Kaufmann in the
case of the southwestern cactus (2008). Regardless, Ministry officials are aware of the
exhaustion of soil as what they perceive to be result of these fires, despite the short-term bursts
of plant growth for which they are set. One particularly intractable problem, to the official
responsible for examining the phenomenon in Ihorombe, is the perception of pastures being
essentially limitless to herders, despite the steady exhaustion of this collective resource. The
resulting malnutrition of zebu has left huge numbers of cattle dangerously sickly and fragile- one
merchant told me that a few weeks some 50 head died in a freezing rain in Ambalavao.
(Anonymous, November 19, 2015). Collectively, these emerging strains have reduced the
economic choices available to people in both regions, and placed a ceiling on the future of cattle
raising in increasingly degraded and dry pasturages.
Population GrowthIntimately connected to the problems with poverty and environmental stress is the burgeoning
rural population, increasingly being forced to share diminishing resources amid stagnant
economic growth, both locally and nationally (van den Heuvel and Evers, 2007). I was surprised
at the consistency with which people who mentioned there being “too many kids today” explicitly
connected this to deepening poverty. An interesting example is an older man I met in Sakaviro’s
Visambo village, one of the wealthier and more colorful inhabitants of the community. He’s
doing well for himself: he owns 40 hectares of land, in an area where 7 or 8 is more typical for
the average farmer. He once had 20 cattle, but he’s sold most of them to pay for school for his
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kids-all 18 of them. Even with the land he inherited from his parents (he was an only child), each
of his children will get only around 2 hectares. Increasingly, families are searching for land to
rent or buy for their children, further adding to the rising cost of living. For many young people,
the cattle and land passed down by one’s parents are absolutely critical to getting one’s start in
life. He himself brought up the negative consequences of increasingly over-divided land, and
tough-to-allocate cattle (Anonymous, November 17, 2015). Multiple informants spoke of
difficulties in giving cattle to one’s children when there are more kids than cows, with the
consequence that some daughters are married without dowries and some sons start without a
single zebu to work their fields. Thus what was much wealth in one generation (in a place where
most wealth is passed down from parent to child) has become insufficient by the next.
Interestingly, participants were generally clear about there being no real “rural exodus” among
young people in the area, despite what they acknowledged to be insufficient resources upon
which to start a life and a family. Rather, many frantically search for work as hired hands in
fields, as several of the young people with whom I spoke attested to doing. In fact, this
unemployment seems to stem as much from the population growth itself as it does from the
well-documented ills of the Malagasy economy, since it’s from this large pool of restless surplus
rural labor that thieves are reportedly drawn (Anonymous, November 19, 2015). One informant
told me that there were so many people looking for work that dahalo bands in Ihorombe often
numbered 400 for a single raid! (Anonymous, November 3, 2015). Despite the acute awareness
of the effects of overpopulation which I encountered in my interviews, family planning remains
unpopular. A Ministry of Population & Women official in Ihosy had two explanations for this
reluctance: first, people view children as a gift from God, helpful in working the land and caring
for their parents when they get old. Second, she said frankly, people do not enjoy using
contraceptives. Whatever the reasoning, she did say that a small but rising percentage of the
population was using birth control. In Sakaviro, however, birth control was available only in
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Ambalavao or Iaratsena. With costs of living as high as they are, it seems understandable that
farmers do not want to spend additional money on condoms (Anonymous, November 20, 2015).
InstitutionsBeyond these “physical stressors”, there exists a rapidly deteriorating institutional and social
cohesiveness surrounding Madagascar’s cattle systems. An aspect of life in the areas I studied
that particularly interested me was the presence (or lack thereof) of institutions in the lives of
those working with cattle. What I found was a sharp disparity in institutional presence in towns
and the countryside, particularly in terms of the Malagasy state. As we’ve seen, the state plays
the type of heavy-handed, corrupt role in the cattle markets themselves predicted by Hatfield
and Davies (2006). In an examination of the causes of corruption in business practice, Martin et.
al (2009) found that
Organizational anomie means that benevolent and principled climates tend to decline in relative influence
while egoistic climates become more influential. Unchecked self-interest, in turn, can become the
dominant normative framework. We believe, and the theoretical perspectives from which we draw
support, that this is the organizational situation where corruption brews and thrives. (122)

In the Malagasy context, this sort of institutional impediment of the normal functioning of the
cattle trade goes well beyond the market itself: a panao hira kely who buys in Sakaraha each
Friday told me he paid no less than 10 bribes to gendarmes and national police each time he
made the trip to Ambalavao (Anonymous, November 12, 2015). A similar role is played by
Malagasy tribunals, today charged with adjudicating disputes over cattle as well as cases of
theft in Ambalavao and Ihosy. Legal costs are often backbreaking for cattle traders and herders,
and accusations of corruption among the courts were widespread. The role of these courts has
grown in importance since informal dina law was suspended in 2010, ostensibly because of
corruption among those responsible for its implementation. Indeed, I ate dinner with a man who
believed that dina operated by leveling accusations of theft against the wealthiest community
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members community, and stripping them of their wealth through the resulting penalties. That
being said, I also encountered a large number of respondents who believed that dina was the
solution to today’s theft problem. When dina was in place, one source in Ihosy said, thieves
were scared! He said that the courts survived off of fees and payments: they suspended dina
because it was too effective in reducing theft. While there has been a superficial correlation with
the suspension of customary cattle law and a rise in theft, it’s difficult to attribute causation to
this. Dina is a system to reimburse, through a penalty, the owners of stolen cattle. It works
within the fokonolona (members of a village community). It once consisted of certain measures
of capital punishment, but this is no longer permitted by the national legal system. A family is
still obliged to make reparations, however. Dina is fluid, it changes often. It exists at village,
district, and regional levels and it works with the state. While advocates of dina acknowledge the
fact that it works closely with the state, they often presented it as an alternative to a government
that was not doing its job. While dina still exists today in Ihorombe, it does so only intermittently
and at the village level. For its findings to be considered valid by the state, a dina ruling needs
approval from the village administrator, commune head, district chief, and regional governor
(Anonymous, November 23, 2015)10. It is thus greatly reduced from its former status as a
complementary legal organ to a state whose resources are often overextended. The potential
importance of dina was emphasized to me by the commandant of the Ambalavao gendarmerie,
among others, who spoke of the near impossibility of his underfunded and underequipped men
enforcing the rule of law in the 20 rural communes surrounding Ambalavao (3 of which,
according to local rumor, no longer have any cattle at all as a result of theft). His preferred
strategy was to work together with rural authorities to provide additional measures of security for
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It is telling, perhaps, of the state’s lack of respect for local institutions that the dina established by the
Convention of Sakaraha in the early 1970s (itself initiated by the state) was viewed as necessary only in the south,
because of its ineffable nature as a “collection of archaic societies” (Rasamoelina 1993).
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a population his men cannot feasibly police (Anonymous, November 11, 2015). The Malagasy
state was repeatedly said to have no presence in the Sakaviro area when I posed the question
to participants. One local resident told me that although he was sure there must be a fokontany
(the smallest unit of government in Madagascar) office somewhere in Sakaviro, he had no idea
where it actually was (Anonymous, November 16, 2015). Beyond Sakaviro, the state has made
efforts to make its military strength felt in some of the areas generally beyond its control: this
year’s Operation Fahalamena, 2012’s Operation Tandroka, and even 1973’s Operation
Ikalamavony all represent attempts by successive Malagasy administrations to confront an
embarrassing and seemingly intractable rural scourge. While Bilal Tarabey’s Madagascar
Dahalo provides reason to fear the human rights infractions often associated with these elite
military unit-led operations, my participants tended to scorn the efficacy of what one man called
a “patchwork” response: after the commandos return to Tana, regardless of how effective their
operation has been, the dahalo return to fill the vacuum left by their unwelcomed guests
(Anonymous, November 20, 2015) (Anonymous, November 12, 2015). There was a palpable
sense of frustration on the part of people living in all three locations towards a central
government seen to be missing in action. I was consistently told in my conversations that the
state’s role was to “protect the peace”, an obligation that few felt was being met by those on
high (Anonymous, November 9, 2015). Corruption and malfeasance, in any case, have made
rural inhabitants less than eager to seek help from institutions in resolving disputes- the
commandant told me that they usually prefer to violently resolve them among themselves
(Anonymous, November 11, 2015). As we have seen, corruption among state veterinarians has
led to rising numbers of sick cattle being passed off as healthy at market, further endangering
the tottering system. There was, amongst all of this criticism of the current shambles in which
the government now finds itself, another, more nostalgic thread present in the interviews: that of
a formerly benevolent state that once looked out for livestock raisers. During the First Republic,
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two officials told me, the state provided animal health care for herders free of charge
(Anonymous, November 3, 23). This policy was said to have been reversed under Ratsiraka or
Albert (1993-97), depending on the informant. Intriguingly, 1973, during the crisis which
ultimately brought Ratsiraka to power, is the year to which Rasamoelina (1993) traces the
proliferation of dahalo activity in Betsileo territory, due to the elimination of taxes on cattle by a
Minister of the Interior “seeking to relax his grip” (Rasamoelina, 1993, p.23). Indeed, there
appears to be a strong association between perceived spikes in theft and crises undermining
the state’s capacity to enforce its monopoly on violence and provide critical services to herders.
Ministry of Livestock officials bemoaned the lack of investment by the central government into
projects aimed at preserving the disappearing omby gasy, despite the outsized role the zebu
play in everyday life for farmers (Anonymous, November 3, 19, 2015)11. Even more alarming is
the fact that, according to the mayor himself, the city of Ihosy has received no funding from the
government in Tana since 2009 (Anonymous, November 19, 2015). The lack of central state
control over local government seems to encourage the rampant corruption common to local
government functionaries. The only other “institutions” which seemed much in evidence during
the study were the market structures themselves. Ihosy’s F.MMM (The Association of Herders,
Intermediaries, and Buyers) whose founder I interviewed, is said around the market to be the
new, de facto informal authority, even acting as a sort of ad-hoc dina in rural areas since the
2010 suspension (Anonymous, November 23, 2015). Indeed, it is important to avoid a narrative
of total government incompetence and bravely struggling industry workers striving for a clean
system. Most people working in the Ambalavao and Ihosy markets seemed to be complicit in
the culture of corruption surrounding them. It appears that this culture (at least in its current
ubiquity) is viewed by locals as a result of the broader decline of state influence in the wake of
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The Ministry of Livestock purportedly receives a smaller budget than any other government department.
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the 2009 political crisis (Anonymous, November 23, 2015). Ironically, as Kaufmann (2008) and
Kull (2004) make abundantly clear, the broader recession of state authority has not precluded
the implementation of heavy-handed top-down policies harmful to the fortunes of herders. In a
sense, Malagasy herders have been handed the worst of both worlds: An absentee state whose
handful of recognizable organs are suffocating the entire cattle economy, and to whom there are
few real alternatives: despite my frequent questions as to other institutions or powers in both the
towns and rural areas, I was never informed of the existence of institutions involved in cattle
beyond the government, market groups, and dina.
Social Cohesion and Perceptions of ChangeTo hear my informants speak of it, there have been fundamental shifts in the way Malagasy
society functions. I chose to largely examine these shifts through the lens of the Malagasy
concept of fihavanana, defined by the French scholar Frederic Sandron as a “system of norms,
rules, and customs which govern local society, interpersonal behaviors, modes of sociability,
and anti-risk strategies “(Sandron, 2008, pg. 1). Sandron (and, more importantly, my informants
themselves) emphasizes the role of fihavanana as a fundamental arbiter of social relations,
particularly in the rural context. My participants frequently evoked the idea in conjunction with
situations requiring mutual aid-to help pay for funerals and burials, to allow a poorer neighbor to
borrow a zebu to plow the fields, etc. Indeed, one source spoke wistfully of a time when people
referred to all property collectively: come into “our” house, look at “our” cattle. (Anonymous,
November 9, 2015). While a good portion of respondents maintained that fihavanana is as
strong today as it ever was, most expressed misgivings as to its contemporary relevance. This
was most apparent in frequent allusions to rising jealousy among neighbors and families, often
manifested in petty theft, and, more disturbingly in violent attacks on family members.
(Anonymous, November 12, 2015). An official in Ambalavao spoke to me at some length about
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increasing violent and fractious disputes over succession to land and cattle. If a father dies,
sons will pay third parties to kill each other rather than share the land among themselves (“It’s
not that they can’t share, it’s that they don’t want to”). (Anonymous, November 11, 2015). While
jealousy of wealth seems to have been a historical factor in Madagascar’s cattle system,
interfamilial violence, rising theft (including of crops, chickens, and even water), and an
increasing preoccupation with pleasure (kids today just want to have fun, to play, one
Ambalavao student told me) among the young are certainly not. Furthermore, many of my
informants in Ambalavao and Ihosy expressed their growing fears about rising drug use and
alcohol consumption among the young, although many acknowledged that many Betsileo and
Bara people have long been heavy-drinkers. To some, this is a sign of some sort of moral
erosion among young people, and was frequently offered as an explanation for the rise in theft
(Anonymous, November 9, 19, 2015). “People are divided”, many of my informants would tell
me. There are also signs of this which are pertinent to the way cattle are actually raised. Many
of the people working with cattle in Sakaviro, for example, told me that when they were younger,
cattle had been herded and grazed collectively. With increasing suspicion, jealousy, and theft,
men began to divide their herds. To many, this hoarding of wealth once regarded as communal
is a disturbing sign that “fihavanana is almost destroyed” (Anonymous, November 12, 17, 2015).
Analysis: What’s New?
Throughout my exploration of Madagascar’s cattle systems, I have wrestled with questions of
the historicity of today’s current ills as they relate to any sort of “new” developments. As we
have found in the historical discussion in the early sections of this paper, considerable evidence
points towards the existence of a cattle economy not hampered but defined by flux and (reliably
violent) turmoil, from the wars of the short-lived Bara cattle kings of the 17th century to the bulletridden front bumpers of the trucks of the Ambalavao gendarmerie today. I would argue that any
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holistic discussion of the system needs to treat theft, no matter how disruptive or shocking it
may seem, as a more or less constant variable. While there are changes afoot in Madagascar’s
security situation, these are not to be found in the existence of largescale and violent theft. Nor
is the system under anything approaching some sort of newly manifested foreign influencecattle have been intimately linked to international trade in Madagascar for at least 400 years.
Throughout those centuries, centralized states based in Tana (namely the Merina-dominated
Kingdom of Madagascar, the French Colonial government, and today’s post-colonial state) have
been deeply involved in the cattle economy (particularly exports), alternately helping and
hindering the development of a healthy system in regions with outsized dependencies upon
zebu. It would therefore be a mistake to construe the Malagasy cattle economy as existing in
isolation. In point of fact, the system relies on outside demand for economic goods generated in
increasingly marginal environments, like those found in the south. That being said, no amount of
historical documentation of cattle theft and related ills seems to account for the sheer scale of
chaos in today’s system, and the deep-seated panic which it is beginning to generate. And
indeed, part of this chaos does appear, at least to my informants, to be attributable to a rising
foreign demand for cattle. While it is important to acknowledge the role played by foreign
consumption, however, nothing I have found in the course of this research leads me to believe
that the deterioration of cattle livelihoods has its root causes beyond Madagascar. This is
particularly evident in the manifestation of ethnic divisions in the way cattle crime is approached
by the state, for instance. As Astuti (1995) found in her examination of the basis of identity
among the Vezo in southwestern Madagascar, ethnicity is often constructed and perceived here
as a facet of one’s occupation as much as anything else. Through this lens, one begins to
understand the national-level stigmatization of the Bara, for instance, whose name literally
means “rude, naïve, barbaric, and simple” (Kent 1970). It seems telling of the historical relations
between those most reliant on cattle and those living elsewhere on the island that the one group
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most closely associated with cattle raising is conceptualized of in such terms. Regardless of
these internal divisions, however, there have been fundamental shifts affecting cattle both its
viability as a resource and the way in which society and institutions interact with it. Despite what
I feel to be a need to emphasize (often in opposition to the narratives of my informants), the
venerable and cyclical nature of dysfunction and conflict within the cattle economy, these shifts
do in fact mark significant departures from the way in which the system has characteristically
lurched through time. This begins with something I have come to refer to as the “hardship
trinity”.
The “Hardship Trinity”- Although the markets themselves often seemed to be the center of the
omby universe, I have come to realize that the Malagasy cattle economy is anchored by the
functions played within it by rural herders and farmers. Although the exchanges within the
system are largely urban, most of the stock and actors involved are rural to the bone. With that
in mind, the frequent mention of three distinct (and recently exacerbated) stressors upon life
related to me by my rural informants made me sit up and pay attention. While the relationship
between poverty, population, and environmental degradation has previously been within the
context of the Vicious Circle Model (VCM) (which holds that deepening poverty, population
growth, and environmental degradation operate as a series of positive feedback loops
consistently worsening standards of living and the environment), Bremner et. al (2012) and de
Sherbinin et. al (2008) are careful to avoid confirmation of the practical existence of such a
circle. Their wide review of the existing literature on the subject seems to suggest that the
relationships between the variables may not be as predictable as the VCM suggests. At the
same time, there is little doubt that significant relationships exist between all three of these
hardships. As such, it makes more sense to me to conceive of these relationships not as a circle
(or even a shape, given how little we still know about the relationships themselves) but as a less
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definite “trinity”. This model may be particularly useful in the case of this study, as we are
dealing not so much with explicit environmental destruction as broader environmental change,
which does not seem to have been considered in its own right under the VCM. In any case,
linkages between each of these variables were repeatedly made by my informants, particularly
in the rural setting of Sakaviro. People are thinking about an increasingly difficult life through
these three broad stresses: as rainfall and crop yields decline, as parents struggle to allocate
resources among their numerous children, and as poverty traps begin to restrict agency for an
increasing proportion of the rural poor. As cattle is intimately linked to survival and prosperity in
the rural setting, there are two-way interactions between the deteriorations in prosperity
resulting from these stresses and one of said prosperity’s principal vehicle- the zebu. Thus we
have the farmer who sold his herd to avoid poverty nonetheless mired within it and the farmer
mired within poverty still unable to ride out of poverty on the back of a newly-bought bull. The
lack of other opportunities amid a stagnant economy and deteriorating security situation have
only served to compound the disproportional reliance upon zebu for the vast majority of people
living outside of Madagascar’s urban areas, particularly in regions like Ihorombe and Haute
Matsiatra where agriculture is less consistently reliable than in the rich-soiled north of the
country, for instance. Keeping in mind that cattle theft as an act should be treated as constant, I
have been nonetheless repeatedly confronted by the fact that this act as a response to poverty
has increased commensurately with decreasing standards of living. This is where the “trinity”
makes its presence felt: pastoralism as a response to a marginal environment is nevertheless
jeopardized by changes in the direction of a yet more marginal environment. Despite the intense
strain placed by the worsening of the “trinity” variables upon the lives of herders, however, I still
saw signs of a social safety net responding to the stress. Take, for example, the farmer in
Soalatsena who relied upon the generosity of his neighbors to plow his fields, or his neighbor
who received loans in times of stress. It is this social safety net which underlies the resiliency of
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rural Malagasy society, constantly adapting12 to a long history of economic turmoil, rapid
change, and violent crime. Which is what has made uncovering new fractures within this
beautifully adaptive society and its institutions so very troubling.

Population Growth
• Surplus Rural Labor
• Insufficient Land and Cattle
• Outstripping economic
Growth

Environmental
Adversity
• Declining Rainfall and
Crop Yields
• Pasturage degradation
(brush fires)
• Locusts

Poverty
• Theft
• Income Insecurity
• Reduction of Cattle
Safety Net

Figure 2: The “Hardship Trinity

Multilevel Anomie in Cattle-Centric CommunitiesWriting in the late 19th century amid pan-European political instability and unfamiliar
industrialization, the French sociologist Emile Durkheim was troubled by what he perceived to
be an increasing “normlessness” taking root among his era’s increasingly harried generations.
He termed this phenomenon “anomie”, which he defined as:
an absence of norms or a fundamental conflict over societies basic values Durkheim called anomie, and
he particularly feared that such a social ‘sickness’ would arise during a time of social upheaval or
transition. In small-scale traditional societies, where relationships are personal and there is a limited
division of labor, it is fairly easy for a general consensus as to the values and norms of society and of the
rights and privileges of individual members to be established and upheld-especially if back by the moral
authority and sanctions of religion. Everyone knows their place and aspires no higher. However, in the
transition from the mechanical solidarity of such societies to the organic solidarity of industrial ones,
where there is an extensive division of labor and relationships are often highly impersonal, a breakdown
in social consensus and so of social controls over the individual is highly possible…Anomie literally
means normlessness. It arises when social controls are weak, when moral and political restraints collapse
and is particularly prevalent during periods of rapid social change, such as industrialization and
12

One of the most striking features of dina law, for example, is its inherent fluidity: it’s constituted and
reconstituted every decade or so in the areas in which it is in effect, reflecting an admirable ability to evolve for
such a vital institution. (Anonymous, November 23, 2015)
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urbanization, when traditional norms and valued are disrupted and uprooted. People become restless and
dissatisfied and a new moral consensus about what people can reasonably expect from life is needed.
Industrialization and consumerism accentuate this process, encouraging specialization and self-interest.
(Durkheim 2003, p.22, 26)

Despite the obvious differences between Industrial Revolution France and as-yet-largely-rural
Madagascar, I encountered multiple aspects of the “sickness” in Durkheim’s description
throughout my interviews in both towns and villages. Perceptions of a steady erosion of morals
and a “breakdown in social consensus” were very much in evidence. These phenomena, and
the unique causes at work in creating them in Madagascar, were superbly documented by
Richard Marcus in his 2008 article Tokana: The collapse of the rural Malagasy community:
Robert Putnam’s now venerated (2001) findings in regard to the United States—that associational life is
in decline—holds in Madagascar as well in that the decrease in social capital is having grievous social
and economic effects on the community members. Yet in contrast to Putnam’s U.S. example, the root
cause of the decline in Malagasy community life is economic hardship. People do not associate with one
another because they are too busy trying to eat. Decreasing resources and the diminution of arable lands
have collided with demographic changes, ecological challenges (Rakotoarisoa 1998), and the problems
of self-serving elites, external interests, and economically challenging social norms to reduce
associational opportunities. (Marcus 2008, p. 86)

While Marcus uses Robert Putnam’s Bowling Alone (2001) as the theoretical perspective
through which he reaches his sobering conclusion, Putnam’s work is itself steeped in the
rhetoric of social disintegration initially probed by Durkheim. Regardless, Marcus’ assertion that
economic hardship is the root cause of anomie as it exists in rural Madagascar was seemingly
reflected in the explicit links made by the people I spoke with between the deterioration of
fihavanana and intensive poverty. Jealousy, interfamilial theft, and arranged assassinations
between brothers do, however, mark an escalation of the forces at play in the mere erosion of
associational life which Marcus described (notably before the 2009 crisis). If my participants are
to be believed, there are initial signs of a near-complete “normlessness”: one in which local and
even familial times are increasingly meaningless in the face of a desperate race to survive amid
the worsening conditions of the “hardship trinity”. It’s important to reiterate that there was not a
total consensus about this decline in fihavanana. That being said, I remain deeply impressed by
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the frequency with which participants described symptoms in anomie in response to questions
about recent changes in life. From a Durkheimian perspective, some of the predicted
manifestations of anomie as it unfolded in industrializing Europe are coming to the fore in a
Malagasy society increasingly interested in consumption. This is reflected in the increasing
desires of young people from rural areas to benefit from the pleasures of life in town (and,
purportedly, their willingness to steal to get to them). Within this wider tableau of anomie one
finds, of course, the country’s most reliable constant: zebu. Marcus’ decision to look at
associational life as a barometer of broader social cohesion is an apt one especially considering
Putnam’s previous success using such a comparison, but I strongly believe that the singular
importance of the zebu in assigning social status, providing a financial safety net, and serving
as a magnet for exchange of all sorts in the form of cattle market towns makes it a uniquely
useful lens through which to view the broader decline of social cohesion here. While a good
portion of this paper has focused on the decline of the cattle population itself, there is good
reason to believe that these two diminutions are connected, based on the body of evidence
outlined above. To me, it is at the confluence of people and zebu, the markets, where one finds
the most striking evidence of their tied fortunes, and the deterioration thereof. This is why I’ve
come to conceptualize of the anomie at play in the Cattle Belt around Ambalavao and Ihosy as
essentially “multilevel”. The role played by the cattle markets, and the institutions associated
with them, is of critical importance in the lives of the rural and urban inhabitants of both of my
regions of study. It has therefore been with some alarm that I have witnessed vivid examples of
institutional decay and evidence of theft embedded within the very fabric of the market, with
devastating consequences for all but the wealthiest participants in the market. As has been
mentioned, corruption among the market’s regulatory bodies, the various levels of local
government, and state veterinarians have all contributed in their own way to cattle decline. I
believe that the general erosion of norms and controls placed upon individual behavior by both
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the broader social bedrock of fihavanana and the ostensible restraining functions of the state
have contributed to a culture of wanton theft and wrongdoing at all levels of the cattle economy,
which has made the intensifying liquidation of the nation’s cattle wealth all the easier. This
process has accelerated, in social and state terms, since the 2009 crisis, after which my
participants noticed marked increases in both the brazenness and volume of corruption within
the markets (Anonymous, November 23, 2015).

Broader
Anomie

Institutional
Failure

Figure 3- Multilevel Anomie

Synthesis and Conclusion: The Decline and (Prospective) Fall of Madagascar’s Cattle Empire-

South-central Madagascar’s cattle raisers face a difficult future. Despite the long history of
volatility within their dearly-held system, including the frequently deleterious effects of a strong
foreign demand for Malagasy livestock products and an often parasitic state based in
Antananarivo, a cycle accustomed to instability is at risk of falling apart at the seams as a result
of a bevy of new and worsening stressors. First and foremost, the longstanding practice of cattle
theft has, indeed, become much more damaging to the system as a whole because of the preexisting razor thin margins of survival for herders. With cattle raisers afraid to own large zebu or
numerous herds, an artificial ceiling of fear has limited the ability of the countryside to absorb
and hold cattle, thus expediting the process of liquidation as domestic and foreign meat demand
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consume cattle faster than the system can produce them. Social statuses predicated upon cattle
wealth have witnessed a drop in the number of herders considered respectable by their peers,
as fewer and fewer of the old grands patrons are able to avoid theft or the need to sell off their
herds to cope with mounting costs of school fees and service access, not to mention muchneeded food to make up for increasingly frequent deficits in crop yields. Indeed, a veritable
“hardship trinity” of poverty, environmental adversity, and population growth have placed
unprecedented strains on a system already compromised by theft and insecurity. Historically, a
dynamic and resilient social framework based on the idea of fihavanana and embedded within
fluid institutions like dina law bodies would rise to the immense challenge posed by physical
strain. Indeed, I encountered multiple examples of just that- adaptation and mutual aid.
Increasingly, however, manifestations of a novel, wholly Malagasy version of the social
normlessness predicted in times of rapid social change and crisis by (among others) Emile
Durkheim have resulted in rising violence, jealousy, and general dysfunction. This is particularly
the case in regards to the cattle economy on which so much of life in Ihorombe and Haute
Matsiatra regions has its foundations. In my regions of study, I was constantly reminded of the
multifaceted importance of the zebu, and the insights which their presence (or lack thereof)
provide into the functioning of communities in which they are raised and exchanged. It was thus
with great sadness that I became increasingly aware of the general corrosion of the institutions
governing the points of exchange so vital to these communities, and usually failing to govern the
rural hinterland at all. Part of this failure of the local arms of the central state’s institutions
appears to be the result of repeated crisis and an almost complete lack of support, both financial
and otherwise, from the capital. I contend, however, that the failures of these institutions are
reflective of the wider fraying of social relations in the communities which host them. Thus we
see widespread and tacitly accepted corruption, apathy towards the greater good of the system,
and an increasing perception of theft and other crime as legitimate options of survival. One
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panao hira kely (who also works as a government accountant) told me that while he didn’t want
to steal, he felt he had to something to improve his life (Anonymous, November 19, 2015). It is
telling of the extent to which the state has failed even its own agents in providing opportunities
for advancement. What’s worse is the relative lack of alternative institutions in what should be
an opportunity vacuum for cohesive groups. While some associations like Ihosy’s F.MMM are
certainly beginning to assert themselves, the state’s suspension of Ihorombe’s dina law (which,
to avoid any romanticization, was itself accused of corruption by several informants) in 2010 is
in keeping with an increasingly cynical imperative within the cattle system to protect corrupt
interests at the expense of healthy markets. One irony in this is the preoccupation of state
institutions with protocols and bureaucracy at the expense of local knowledge and concerns
often being flaunted by those formally tasked with safeguarding them. The blame falls too,
however, upon the informal powers-that-be within the system: the grands patrons who fuel the
trafficking of stolen cattle while knowing full-well its long-term effects on the system they depend
on. The interconnected social disintegration within institutions and the general livestock raising
population has begun to impede the ability of Malagasy herders to adapt to the rising physical
hardships of the present, which seem to call out for a great deal more cooperation. If Marcus
(2008) is to be believed, the deepening economic hardship one may expect to result from any
continued decline in the size and quality of cattle herds will only serve to further strain the social
fabric and institutions. The situation may not, however, be quite as dire as it seems. While the
cattle systems under consideration here arguably face greater challenges than ever before, they
have a long and distinguished history of overcoming adverse conditions causing panic and
cynicism among the people who compose the systems. If there is hope, it is that this is not a
society new to crisis: it is one forged in it. In the end, this is not about cows. This is about a
collection of remarkable and complicated human beings struggling to keep their heads above
water. And it is a story worth telling.
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RecommendationsAs several informants opined to me, there would be no need or room for dahalo if there weren’t
people looking to buy stolen cattle. This encompasses, of course, Malagasy grands patrons, but
it also includes Chinese, South African, Comorian, and Mauritian buyers operating in
slaughterhouses on the island and waiting in boats offshore. Perhaps the most effective way to
halt the erosion of Madagascar’s cattle wealth is to put pressure on the governments of
countries which consume stolen cattle to crack down on their citizens’ illicit purchases in
Madagascar. The contemporary political situation on the island itself seems to preclude much
possibility of the Malagasy state itself adequately policing the cattle trade domestically, much
less restricting foreign abuses. Towards this end, continued research on both the wider issues
discussed in this paper (cattle decline and social disintegration being chief among them) and
their palpable effects could go a long way towards starting some form of consumer-society
backlash against the consumption of products whose legitimacy and legality, given the paucity
of any sort of meaningful regulation, should not by any means be accepted at face value. It is up
to consumers in the aforementioned countries to demand stricter standards for Malagasy cattle
products. Perhaps more importantly, it is incumbent upon Western governments (namely
France, the United States, and the European Union) to apply pressure to both the Malagasy
government and the governments of consumer societies to re-examine the existing
consumption of zebu abroad. The long-term answer, of course, is for Madagascar to break its
damning cycle of political crisis and the connected breakdown of social relations. Participants
pined for the days when the state provided support for both the health and safety of rural
inhabitants and their animals. While the current reality of poverty and state fragility may make a
complete return to the level support of those days next to impossible, providing even a
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semblance of continuity within which institutions can begin to repair themselves is a prerequisite for any amelioration of the situation. If history is any guide, it is the role of dominant
political units (today, Madagascar’s Fourth Republic) to assert themselves over the slow-burning
chaos that is the cattle economy. The Malagasy government would do well to rediscover that.
Questions for Further StudyWith the considerable limitations inherent within both this paper’s methodology and its validity,
further research is still greatly needed on a variety of pressing, unanswered questions. To me,
foremost among these are those concerning the unique manifestations of anomie and cattle
decline elsewhere in Madagascar, particularly in the even more strained regions of the far
south, such as Atsimo Andrefana and Antandroy. If my findings have any truth to them, it is in
these regions that one may observe the most severe consequences of the processes described
here. As has been acknowledged, the exact relationships between the hardship variables of
poverty, resource degradation, and population remain poorly understood, and further study of
the explicit connections (if they exist) among these factors could have lasting implications for the
future of sustainable development and poverty relief. Lastly, considerable effort should be made
to re-establish some sort of credible awareness of the size Malagasy cattle population. The
obscurity shrouding existing data on zebu makes effective deterrence of theft and monitoring of
illness next to impossible. With the Ministry of Livestock (by its own admission) unable to
legitimately provide these figures, it falls to independent researchers to provide some measure
of clarity.
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Glossary of Terms
Dahalo- A Malagasy cattle thief. Purported to be a distortion of a Bara rite of passage, it stands
for what is in fact a long-running, geographically dispersed phenomenon.
Dina- A Malagasy legal tradition practiced alternately at the village, commune, district, and
regional level. While also associated with conversation efforts, the tradition has played a vital
role in attempting to control cattle theft.
FIB (Fiche Identitaire Bovin) - The primary method of documentation within Madagascar’s cattle
economy, a biographical form accompanying each zebu sold at market.
Fihavanana- Madagascar’s “system of norms, rules, and customs which govern local society,
interpersonal behaviors, modes of sociability, and anti-risk strategies. “(Sandron, 2008, pg. 1)
Fokonolona- The Malagasy term for the citizenry of a village, in this context constituting dina
bodies.
Fokontany- Base-level administrative unit determined by population in Madagascar, at the
neighborhood level in cities, but covering a wider geographic area in less densely populated
rural areas.
Jama- While I initially thought that the term referred to any local defense group combatting cattle
theft in the rural areas, it seems to refer pointedly to men employed in that capacity who come
from the south-east of the country, purportedly with certain charms and “sorceries” which give
them special protection against harm.
Kabary- A proud, wholly Malagasy oratorical tradition.
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Panao Hira Kely- While the term’s meaning is rather fluid in its reference to those working in
specific roles in the cattle economy, it tends to refer to those who buy at one market (usually
Sakaraha or Ihosy) and sell for a higher price at another (usually Ambalavao).
Panera/Demarcheur- Constituting a majority of those working on market days, the panera is
responsible for seeking out buyers and initiating price negotiations on behalf of more powerful
patrons. Panera make very little on each transaction in relation to their employers.
Patron-Again, a fluid term, and often one of respect in the markets, but also signifying a
prominent seller, typically from the south. The so-called “cattle barons” of the island.
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Map of Study Region and Associated Cattle Chain

Source: Google Earth
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